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Ostrom, Elinor. View full catalog record.
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
Not a MyNAP member yet? Register for a free account to start saving and receiving special member only perks. The prototypical scenario is simple. There is a resource—usually referred to as a common-pool resource—to which a large number of people have access. The resource might be an oceanic ecosystem from which fish are harvested, the global atmosphere into which greenhouse gases are released, or a forest from which timber is harvested. Overuse of the resource creates problems, often destroying its sustainability.
Handbook of New Institutional Economics pp Cite as. Open-access, common-pool resources, such as many fisheries, aquifers, oil pools, and the atmosphere, often require some type of regulation of private access and use to avoid wasteful exploitation. In the absence of constraints on users, such as those provided by informal community norms, more formal property rights, or other types of state regulation, individuals competitively exploit the resource rapidly and wastefully. Short-term horizons dominate, with little investment or trade to channel the resource across time or across users to higher-valued applications. This excessive extraction, which amounts to private plunder, continues so long as it is in the interests of the individual parties, even if society would be better off with less intensive and extensive use. Without some limits on individual behavior to better reflect broader, social benefits and costs, only private net benefit calculations govern resource use decisions.
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Accueil Dossiers Irrigation systems as common-pool Common-pool resources are natural or man-made resources shared among different users, a condition that produces a competition for their utilization leading often although not necessarily to their degradation or even to their destruction. This paper shortly discusses the "theory of the commons", as developed in the last 20 years by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues, and illustrates it by mean of case studies regarding a number of irrigation systems in Northern Italy Lombardy and Aosta Valley. We show that that different social mechanisms, like the shared values e the social network existing inside the community of users, play a significant role in influencing the outcomes of the institutional schemes for the commons management. Examples are the world forests, fisheries, water basins, biodiversity and even the atmosphere. Our main goal is to present the role that different social mechanisms play in influencing the outcomes of the institutional schemes for the commons management.
Rules, games, and common-pool resources I Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.
Common-pool resource , a resource made available to all by consumption and to which access can be limited only at high cost. Some classic examples of common-pool resources are fisheries , forests , underwater basins, and irrigation systems. In the case of fishing , fishermen face the temptation to harvest as many fish as possible, because if they do not, someone else will.
While the tragedy of the commons is real, there are many instances where institutions develop to protect against overexploitation. In this important work, the authors explore empirically, theoretically, and experimentally the nature of such institutions and the way they come about.
Это был ТРАНСТЕКСТ, компьютер, равного которому не было в мире, - шифровальная машина, засекреченная агентством. Подобно айсбергу машина скрывала девяносто процентов своей массы и мощи под поверхностью. Ее секрет был спрятан в керамических шахтах, уходивших на шесть этажей вниз; ее похожий на ракету корпус окружал лабиринт подвесных лесов и кабелей, из-под которых слышалось шипение фреоновой системы охлаждения. Генераторы внизу производили постоянный низкочастотный гул, что делало акустику в шифровалке какой-то загробной, присущей миру призраков.
Разве не так, коммандер. - Ни в коем случае! - отрезал Стратмор. Хейл вскипел: - Послушайте меня, старина.
Хотя и ненамеренно, именно Стратмор привел Дэвида Беккера в АНБ в тот памятный день, позвонив ему по телефону.